The Twins did pretty well in 2008, falling just one game shy of the AL Central Division title. There's been a lot of talk about how the team can improve for 2009, though, and that talk tends to follow one of two threads:
Myth #4: The Twins need to keep their young 5-man rotation intact and allow them to develop.
Or, alternately...
Myth #4a: If the Twins do need to give up on one of their starters to acquire an offensive player, deal Nick Blackburn.
Let me start out by saying that the idea of keeping the rotation fairly intact isn't, in and of itself, a horrible idea. Most fans who propose this line of thinking are probably, consciously or not, comparing the current Twins to the Atlanta Braves circa 1991.
The Braves had just bounced from worst-to-first, making the World Series for the first time since they were the Milwaukee Braves back in 1958. Even then, the strength of their team was in their starting pitching, and it was put together in a way that'll look very familiar to current Twins fans: one veteran starter serving as staff ace (Charlie Leibrandt) and five other pitchers, all of whom were under 26 years of age. By the start of the 1993 season, the Braves had replaced Leibrandt with former Cub Greg Maddux, and their reign over the American League East was locked-in; starting from 1991, the Braves won fourteen straight division titles, though just a single World Series title in all that time.
So let's go back to 1991. The best hitter on your team is probably 30-year old third baseman Terry Pendleton, though your best home run hitter is centerfielder Ron Gant. However, you do have a few holes in your offense: catcher Greg Olson, first-baseman Sid Bream, and shortstop Rafael Belliard are all among the worst offensive performers for their positions, though Bream has the reputation of being one of the top defensive players at his position. You can already tell that your experiment with Deion Sanders isn't going to work out particularly well, and you're looking for a long-term upgrade at one of those three positions, but in order to do that, you're going to probably have to give up one of those five young starters. Of those five starters, only three really have any trade value, and they rack up like this:
A - 25 yrs old - 20-11, 2.55 ERA in 1991, 33-41, 4.29 ERA in 105 career starts prior to 1991
B - 24 yrs old - 14-13, 3.80 ERA in 1991, 28-29, 3.68 ERA in 75 career starts prior to 1991
C - 21 yrs old - 18-8, 3.38 ERA in 1991, 3-11, 5.64 ERA in 20 career starts prior to 1991
As additional information, pitcher A was a late 2nd round draft pick who'd compiled a 7-17, mid-4 ERA at AAA prior to first being called up, while striking out 103 and walking 83 in 190 innings. Pitcher B was a minor-league acquisition from another franchise, having been taken in the 22nd round, but who put together a combined 10-6, near-3 ERA pitching for the same AAA team pitcher A pitched for, while striking out 120 and walking 48 in 151 innings. Pitcher 3 was a #3 overall pick who didn't reach AAA until the other two pitchers were throwing in the majors, and compiled a 5-5, 3.39 ERA mark in 13 AAA starts, striking out 69 and walking 21 in 82 innings.
Pitcher A had struggled for years, but put together a breakout season and won the Cy Young in 1991 (that alone should be a dead giveaway as to his identity), while pitcher C finished sixth in the same vote. Who do you deal? The breakout pitcher, on the theory that his value will never be higher? The youngster, on the theory that he doesn't have as great a track record and might slow down? Or the man in the middle -- solid enough to contribute but not someone who looks like a potential star?
Pitcher C is Steve Avery, who put together another couple of good years before injury troubles began haunting him and eventually drove him out of baseball after a decent but unspectacular 11 year career (96-83, career park-adjusted ERA+ of 100).
Pitcher B is John Smoltz, who had only one breakout season of his own (in 1996, when he went 24-8 and won his only Cy Young award), but who was probably the best #3 starter in baseball for a decade until finally converting to closer after an injury rehab and nearly winning another Cy in that role. If Smoltz is done after just 28 innings of work in 2008, he departs with a decidedly above-average 20-year career (210-147 with 154 saves and a career park-adjusted ERA+ of 127).
Pitcher A is Tom Glavine, who would go on to become one of the top starters of his era (though eclipsed by his teammate Greg Maddux), and retires with a Hall-of-Fame caliber career (305 wins, 2607 strikeouts, two Cy Youngs and two other times finishing second in the voting, and a career ERA of 3.54).
This isn't to suggest that Nick Blackburn will become the next Tom Glavine -- the point, though, is that it's really difficult to tell at such a young age how a player will develop and what peaks and valleys he'll hit during the course of his career.
The other point in comparing the 2008 Twins to the 1991 Braves is that, of those five young starters, some of them faded from view, never to be noticed again. The other two starters not named above were 25-year old Armando Reynoso, who'd put together a decent 12-11 4.00 ERA in Coors Field in 1993 to start a peripatetic 10 year period as a semi-regular starter, and 25-year old Pete Smith, who'd hurled for the team when it was horrible (combined record of 30-48 with Atlanta) and who was quickly forgotten after being traded to the Mets for Dave Gallagher after the 1993 season.
The Braves during this era always had a strong rotation, but seldom had great #5 starters and often didn't have a particularly impressive #4 starter. The year the Braves won the Series, Avery was 7-13 with a 4.67 ERA and was pitching in pain, while Kent Mercker was the #5 starter who went 7-8 with a 4.15 ERA. The next year, when the Braves lost the Series to the Yankees, they tried to fill the #5 slot with Jason Schmidt (3-4, 6.75) and Denny Neagle (2-3, 5.59). Neagle went on to win 20 for the Braves in 1997, but the back of the rotation was a revolving door featuring stints by Terrell Wade (2-3, 5.36), Chris Brock (0-0, 5.58), and finally Kevin Millwood (5-3, 4.03). In 1998 both Neagle and Millwood helped give the Braves a true five-man powerhouse rotation, but they were knocked out of the post-season by the Padres anyway. Neagle was gone in 1999, though, and the Braves tried to replace him with Odalis Perez (4-6, 6.00), Terry Mulholland (4-2, 2.98), and Bruce Chen (2-2, 5.47). The Braves always seemed to have a Big Three, and often had a Big Fourth to join them, but very seldom did they have a true Big Five, which seems to be what most Twins fans are looking for from the current rotation.
Not to mention that the Twins have plenty of alternatives if any of their current Big Five can't answer the bell -- Boof Bonser was a solid starter for the Twins a couple of years ago and could be again given the opportunity, while Phil Humber is frequently projected as a middle-of-the-order starter, someone who might just thrive developing in the low-pressure #5 slot. And those are just two guys off the top of my head in a Twins organization that is very pitching-deep these days.
My feeling is that there's too little to distinguish the records of the Twins pitchers thus far to really know which of them has the best shot to develop into an All-Star or even a Hall-of-Famer, so in effect from the club's perspective, they all have the same value until one of them demonstrates otherwise. On the other hand, given that some of these pitchers have a higher perceived value to other franchises based on their age, draft position, etc., I think we could get a lot more back in trade by dangling, say, a Kevin Slowey than we could by dangling a Boof Bonser or a Nick Blackburn.
I think if the club can find a deal that will bring in an offensive player who will definitely improve the ballclub, they should do so. If that deal involves giving up a pitcher like a Kevin Slowey, I don't see that Slowey's 'potential' should dissuade them from making the deal.
All stats courtesy of baseball-reference.com and thebaseballcube.com.
Saturday, December 27, 2008
Wednesday, December 17, 2008
Interlude #2 - Told Ya
Note to self: Stop writing these interlude pieces and finish the danged myths series already!
Back in 2001, former Minnesota Twins outfielder Kirby Puckett was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame on the first ballot by the Baseball Writers Association of America. At the time, I thought it was a bad move, and have occasionally repeated that sentiment online, usually to much razzing and ado from Twins partisans.
Then I stopped by Joe Posnanski's blog today.
Posnanski is discussing the Hall of Fame, and making the argument that there are three routes, for an non-pitcher, to getting in via the BBWAA vote: hit a milestone (Posnanski uses 3000 hits and 500 HR, though those specific milestones may be in danger, especially the last one), be an excellent defensive player with some offense at catcher, shortstop, second, or occasionally third, or bring intangibles.
He lists Kirby Puckett as one of the six players let in under the 'intangibles' rubric, but also notes:
3. Kirby Puckett
Comment: This was not an especially controversial pick at the time — but it is now.
Posnanski attributes Puckett's popularity in the BBWAA vote to having a decent case to begin with, then getting a huge emotional boost from both Puckett's own popularity as a player as well as the perceived tragedy of Puckett's retirement due to glaucoma (though the official plaque in the HoF doesn't use the simple term 'glaucoma', preferring to use the more medically accurate and wordier 'irreversable retina damage in his right eye'; why this is true could spawn conspiracy theories, I'm sure). I agree with this analysis. The part I don't completely agree with is his followup:
In retrospect, Puckett will probably be viewed as one of the poorer choices by the BBWAA....
I'm not sure it's necessary to say 'in retrospect', here, because for some of us (ahem), it was pretty danged clear from the opening bell that Puckett wasn't as great a HoFer as he seemed in 2001.
A bit of clarification: I'm not, and never have, claimed that Puckett is one of the weakest Hall of Famers ever enshrined -- there are pretty clearly players already in the Hall on the day Puckett entered who weren't nearly as good as he was. The issue is that, if you list the players you think of as the weakest Hall of Famers, you'll find that they're almost all Veteran's Committee picks. Let me crib from Bill James's own list of the Hall of Famers with the fewest Hall of Fame standards as defined in his book "Whatever Happened to the Hall of Fame?":
C - Ray Schalk (A good catcher, but enshrined more for his presence as one of the few members of the 1919 White Sox who stayed honest.)
1B - George Kelly/Frank Chance (Kelly was an outstanding defensive first baseman by reputation who also allegedly was a great clutch hitter -- John McGraw said that Kelly had more important hits than any other player he'd managed; though they didn't track OPS+ in those days, Kelly had just two seasons with a better than 120 rating, meaning he was, in that way, his era's Doug Mientkiewicz -- Chance, of course, was part of the famous trio from the poem)
2B - Johnny Evers
SS - Joe Tinker
3B - Jimmy Collins (a turn-of-the-century player who jumped to the nascent American League when it formed in 1901, credited with player-managing the World Series champion Boston club in 1904; what defensive numbers survive suggest he was a solid defensive third-baseman for his era but not overwhelmingly good, and his offensive contributions were solid as well, though his 1904 season was one of his poorest as a player during the AL portion of his career)
LF - Chick Hafey (His Hall plaque specifically mentions his .317 career batting average, but doesn't note that the league average was .291 during his career, which coincided with the start of the lively-ball era; he was a very good offensive player, with a peak OPS+ of about 150 and a career OPS of nearly .900, but he only played 13 seasons, and his career was basically over after his age 31 season)
CF - Lloyd Waner (before I looked it up, I'd have guessed Elmer Flick or Slidin' Billy Hamilton was the least-impressive centerfield HoFer, but the numbers show Waner was a high-average, no power, no walks hitter in an era where people were walking and hitting for power all over the place; for example, in 1931, Waner led the NL in hits with 214, batted .314 against a league average of .284, but had an OBP of just .352 against a league average of .343 and slugged .407 against a league average of .401. He set the major league record for singles in a season until Ichiro broke it, but his career OPS+ was just 99.)
RF - Tommy McCarthy (known as one of the 'Heavenly Twins', McCarthy played his entire career in the 19th century, and as such might not be an entirely fair target as least-impressive right-field HoFer. On the other hand, McCarthy also played just 13 seasons and finished with a career OPS+ of 102, meaning he was just about an average performer statistically for his era)
Every one of these players was elected by the Veteran's Committee, not by the BBWAA.
The least-credentialed non-pitcher elected by the BBWAA may well be Ralph Kiner, who qualifies as only having earned 34% of Hall of Fame standards according to baseball-reference.com. Kiner played just 10 seasons, and was elected in his final year of BBWAA eligibility in 1975 with only one vote to spare -- had only 271 rather than 273 writers placed Kiner on the ballot, he would not have been elected. In other words, you can probably make Kiner your definition of a borderline Hall of Famer.
Puckett met 39% of Hall of Fame standards, significantly ahead of Kiner, but not so far ahead that he ranks among the 'typical' Hall of Famer. Puckett ranks even with Joe Torre and Juan Gonzalez on the career list of Hall of Fame standards, and even falls a bit behind Jim Edmonds, Al Oliver, Nomar Garciaparra, and Ellis Burks, none of whom were or are likely to be elected to the Hall based on their playing careers (Torre has a solid shot when his managerial career is considered as well). Lou Whitaker met 41% of Hall of Fame standards, and was dropped from the first ballot he ever appeared on.
The real embarrassment, though, is not that Puckett is in the Hall and better, more accomplished players are not -- if that were the case, then half of the members of the Hall of Fame would be considered embarrassments. No, the real embarrassment is that Puckett was named on the first ballot; only one player with fewer Hall of Fame standards was ever inducted on the first ballot, and Jackie Robinson's intangibles pretty much trump Puckett's all the way around.
In his New Historical Baseball Abstract, Bill James ranked Puckett as the #8 centerfielder in baseball history and suggested his early exit from baseball shouldn't harm his chances of making the Hall of Fame. Considering that Puckett's career Win Shares are nearly identical to those of Jim Rice (and Win Shares does compensate for park effects and defensive contibutions), and that Rice is only a possible Hall of Famer this season in his final year of BBWAA eligibility, and that Puckett actually has fewer Win Shares than Royal outfielder Amos Otis, who received exactly zero votes for the Hall in his only year of eligibility, perhaps even James might re-examine Puckett's candidacy for the Hall of Fame.
Back in 2001, former Minnesota Twins outfielder Kirby Puckett was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame on the first ballot by the Baseball Writers Association of America. At the time, I thought it was a bad move, and have occasionally repeated that sentiment online, usually to much razzing and ado from Twins partisans.
Then I stopped by Joe Posnanski's blog today.
Posnanski is discussing the Hall of Fame, and making the argument that there are three routes, for an non-pitcher, to getting in via the BBWAA vote: hit a milestone (Posnanski uses 3000 hits and 500 HR, though those specific milestones may be in danger, especially the last one), be an excellent defensive player with some offense at catcher, shortstop, second, or occasionally third, or bring intangibles.
He lists Kirby Puckett as one of the six players let in under the 'intangibles' rubric, but also notes:
3. Kirby Puckett
Comment: This was not an especially controversial pick at the time — but it is now.
Posnanski attributes Puckett's popularity in the BBWAA vote to having a decent case to begin with, then getting a huge emotional boost from both Puckett's own popularity as a player as well as the perceived tragedy of Puckett's retirement due to glaucoma (though the official plaque in the HoF doesn't use the simple term 'glaucoma', preferring to use the more medically accurate and wordier 'irreversable retina damage in his right eye'; why this is true could spawn conspiracy theories, I'm sure). I agree with this analysis. The part I don't completely agree with is his followup:
In retrospect, Puckett will probably be viewed as one of the poorer choices by the BBWAA....
I'm not sure it's necessary to say 'in retrospect', here, because for some of us (ahem), it was pretty danged clear from the opening bell that Puckett wasn't as great a HoFer as he seemed in 2001.
A bit of clarification: I'm not, and never have, claimed that Puckett is one of the weakest Hall of Famers ever enshrined -- there are pretty clearly players already in the Hall on the day Puckett entered who weren't nearly as good as he was. The issue is that, if you list the players you think of as the weakest Hall of Famers, you'll find that they're almost all Veteran's Committee picks. Let me crib from Bill James's own list of the Hall of Famers with the fewest Hall of Fame standards as defined in his book "Whatever Happened to the Hall of Fame?":
C - Ray Schalk (A good catcher, but enshrined more for his presence as one of the few members of the 1919 White Sox who stayed honest.)
1B - George Kelly/Frank Chance (Kelly was an outstanding defensive first baseman by reputation who also allegedly was a great clutch hitter -- John McGraw said that Kelly had more important hits than any other player he'd managed; though they didn't track OPS+ in those days, Kelly had just two seasons with a better than 120 rating, meaning he was, in that way, his era's Doug Mientkiewicz -- Chance, of course, was part of the famous trio from the poem)
2B - Johnny Evers
SS - Joe Tinker
3B - Jimmy Collins (a turn-of-the-century player who jumped to the nascent American League when it formed in 1901, credited with player-managing the World Series champion Boston club in 1904; what defensive numbers survive suggest he was a solid defensive third-baseman for his era but not overwhelmingly good, and his offensive contributions were solid as well, though his 1904 season was one of his poorest as a player during the AL portion of his career)
LF - Chick Hafey (His Hall plaque specifically mentions his .317 career batting average, but doesn't note that the league average was .291 during his career, which coincided with the start of the lively-ball era; he was a very good offensive player, with a peak OPS+ of about 150 and a career OPS of nearly .900, but he only played 13 seasons, and his career was basically over after his age 31 season)
CF - Lloyd Waner (before I looked it up, I'd have guessed Elmer Flick or Slidin' Billy Hamilton was the least-impressive centerfield HoFer, but the numbers show Waner was a high-average, no power, no walks hitter in an era where people were walking and hitting for power all over the place; for example, in 1931, Waner led the NL in hits with 214, batted .314 against a league average of .284, but had an OBP of just .352 against a league average of .343 and slugged .407 against a league average of .401. He set the major league record for singles in a season until Ichiro broke it, but his career OPS+ was just 99.)
RF - Tommy McCarthy (known as one of the 'Heavenly Twins', McCarthy played his entire career in the 19th century, and as such might not be an entirely fair target as least-impressive right-field HoFer. On the other hand, McCarthy also played just 13 seasons and finished with a career OPS+ of 102, meaning he was just about an average performer statistically for his era)
Every one of these players was elected by the Veteran's Committee, not by the BBWAA.
The least-credentialed non-pitcher elected by the BBWAA may well be Ralph Kiner, who qualifies as only having earned 34% of Hall of Fame standards according to baseball-reference.com. Kiner played just 10 seasons, and was elected in his final year of BBWAA eligibility in 1975 with only one vote to spare -- had only 271 rather than 273 writers placed Kiner on the ballot, he would not have been elected. In other words, you can probably make Kiner your definition of a borderline Hall of Famer.
Puckett met 39% of Hall of Fame standards, significantly ahead of Kiner, but not so far ahead that he ranks among the 'typical' Hall of Famer. Puckett ranks even with Joe Torre and Juan Gonzalez on the career list of Hall of Fame standards, and even falls a bit behind Jim Edmonds, Al Oliver, Nomar Garciaparra, and Ellis Burks, none of whom were or are likely to be elected to the Hall based on their playing careers (Torre has a solid shot when his managerial career is considered as well). Lou Whitaker met 41% of Hall of Fame standards, and was dropped from the first ballot he ever appeared on.
The real embarrassment, though, is not that Puckett is in the Hall and better, more accomplished players are not -- if that were the case, then half of the members of the Hall of Fame would be considered embarrassments. No, the real embarrassment is that Puckett was named on the first ballot; only one player with fewer Hall of Fame standards was ever inducted on the first ballot, and Jackie Robinson's intangibles pretty much trump Puckett's all the way around.
In his New Historical Baseball Abstract, Bill James ranked Puckett as the #8 centerfielder in baseball history and suggested his early exit from baseball shouldn't harm his chances of making the Hall of Fame. Considering that Puckett's career Win Shares are nearly identical to those of Jim Rice (and Win Shares does compensate for park effects and defensive contibutions), and that Rice is only a possible Hall of Famer this season in his final year of BBWAA eligibility, and that Puckett actually has fewer Win Shares than Royal outfielder Amos Otis, who received exactly zero votes for the Hall in his only year of eligibility, perhaps even James might re-examine Puckett's candidacy for the Hall of Fame.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Interlude: That was quick...
Taking a short break from the 'five myths' series to comment on a strange shift in the weather in the Twins blogosphere over the past few weeks: the degree to which Twins bloggers are turning on Delmon Young.
Young is a former #1 overall pick by the Tampa Bay Rays (back when they were still the Devil Rays), who was eventually perceived by that organization to be a bit less stellar than advertised. Perhaps it makes sense that the team that drafted you #1 overall would be disappointed that you didn't take the majors completely by storm, especially when you make a big show out of signing a significant contract before even playing a single minor-league ballgame.
Why would Twins bloggers turn on Young? It's a bit of a mystery. Let's start with Stick & Ball Guy's article, 'Looking Back At The Delmon Debacle'.
Right off the bat I have a problem -- sure, SBG is an internet guy and reaches for the hyperbole a bit more often than would be warranted by a more sober analyst, but to describe a season where Young served as the primary Twins left-fielder and helped the club to force a 163rd game to determine the outcome of the AL Central division title as a 'debacle' is a bit beyond the pale. What would SBG have said if Young's season had been as bad as that of Carlos Gomez?
Wait, he says that Gomez had a better year than Young? How's that again?
Oh, he does it by cherry-picking metrics, and then misinterpreting them. For starters, SBG claims that Young was overall below replacement level in value because of his -18.4 runs as measured by UZR. Of course, UZR runs aren't measured from the replacement level, but from the league average. Since SBG doesn't note whether he's using STATS UZR (which doesn't weight for handedness or ground/flyball pitcher tendencies, park effects, or even the estimated difficulty of the batted ball) or Mitchel Lichtman's more advanced UZR (which does adjust for these factors), I can't speak to how accurate the metric might be. I will point out that the Hardball Times Win Shares analysis has Young earning more defensive Win Shares in left field than Denard Span earned in right for the Twins in 2008, so the idea that Young was costing the Twins ballgames with his glove isn't necessarily a hard, undeniable fact -- even in Young's infamously bad defensive game against the Royals, the Twins eventually rallied and won. Of course, with Young trailing all major-league left-fielders in Dewan plus/minus in 2008, it seems that his reputation is assured, at least, despite nearly all of that minus total having been put up in 2008 -- the three-year plus/minus totals have Young comfortably ahead of true defensive butchers like Pat Burrell and Manny Ramirez.
For the record, that Hardball Times link above shows that Young and Gomez had roughly equivalent seasons in terms of Win Shares, with Young slightly ahead. So no, it's not obvious that Gomez had a better year.
SBG also complains that Young "supposedly had this crazy high ceiling" when he was acquired by the Twins, though the reason why is pretty clear to see if you look at it -- certainly his ceiling is far higher than that of Carlos Gomez:
- Young and Gomez are nearly the same age; Young (born September 14, 1985) is actually less than three months older than Gomez (born December 4, 1985). For baseball purposes, they are the same age, so any potential development available to Gomez is, in theory, exactly as available to Young.
- Young has had better production in the minor leagues than Gomez; Gomez batted .278 with 18 home runs in 1291 minor league at-bats, primarily at A and AA. Young has hit .318 with 59 home runs (more in each of two different seasons than Gomez has hit in his entire minor league career) in 1413 minor league at-bats, mainly at AA and AAA.
- Young has put up those superior numbers while playing against tougher competition at the same age. When Gomez was 18, he spent the entire season playing for the Mets' two rookie-league teams; Young spent his age-18 season in A-ball for the Rays. At 19, Gomez spent the whole year in A-ball; Young split time between AA and AAA. Gomez got a fairly good-sized cup of coffee with the Mets due to outfield injuries in his age-21 season; Young spent his entire age-21 seasaon on the Ray's big-league roster and finished 2nd in the Rookie of the Year vote that season.
Anybody who claims that Gomez has a higher ceiling than Young doesn't know what the hell he's talking about. Though similarity scores are notoriously sketchy for players with such few actual big-league appearances, it's still telling that Young's of-age comps include Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente and Carl Yastrzemski (Yaz is actually Young's #1 of-age comp), while Gomez's of-age comps include Milt Cuyler and Lee Mazzilli. Young could continue to disappoint and still end up with a career not far from Larry Hisle's, while Gomez would have to gain about thirty points of batting average just to be the next Ted Uhlaender.
Okay, now I'm engaging in a bit of hyperbole, but just a bit. Right now, people are complaining because Jason Bartlett is getting way more credit than he deserves for the Rays run to the World Series last year, and Matt Garza hasn't yet proven himself a head-case with his new ballclub. Had the Twins won game 163 and advanced to the Series themselves, I doubt there would be nearly as much Delmon Young hatred on teh interwebs as I've seen of late.
If the Twins can get a good deal for Young, I won't complain, but the final nail in SBG's coffin comes when he talks about how much better not just Carlos Gomez is than Delmon Young, but how great it would be if the Twins acquired journeyman Gabe Gross, traded to the Rays for a minor leaguer during the 2008 season. Now Gross is far from a worthless player -- he'll take a walk and occasionally surprise you with some pop in his bat, and he's a solid if unspectacular defensive outfielder. But let's put it this way -- Gabe Gross's career, to this point, has been nearly identical (similarity score 960) to that of Dustan Mohr through his age 28 season. Mohr started falling off the planet at age 29, and didn't get even a single big-league at-bat in 2008. Gross would have been a great acquisition back in 2005, when he could have filled Mohr's role on the club after the latter's departure from the Twins; picking Gross up now would be like taking a flyer on Rickey Henderson. Long-term plan, this ain't.
All indications are that Young had real problems adjusting to the Metrodome defensively, and word from sources indicates that Young has something to prove this season, possibly his last before arbitration. Given how close the Twins were to the playoffs last year, and how much room Young has in his upside, I think the Twins would be crazy not to at least give Young a chance to show the club what he can do.
Of course, Ron Gardenhire is thinking of starting Nick Punto at short and Carlos Gomez in the outfield, so it might well be a long, long summer.
Young is a former #1 overall pick by the Tampa Bay Rays (back when they were still the Devil Rays), who was eventually perceived by that organization to be a bit less stellar than advertised. Perhaps it makes sense that the team that drafted you #1 overall would be disappointed that you didn't take the majors completely by storm, especially when you make a big show out of signing a significant contract before even playing a single minor-league ballgame.
Why would Twins bloggers turn on Young? It's a bit of a mystery. Let's start with Stick & Ball Guy's article, 'Looking Back At The Delmon Debacle'.
Right off the bat I have a problem -- sure, SBG is an internet guy and reaches for the hyperbole a bit more often than would be warranted by a more sober analyst, but to describe a season where Young served as the primary Twins left-fielder and helped the club to force a 163rd game to determine the outcome of the AL Central division title as a 'debacle' is a bit beyond the pale. What would SBG have said if Young's season had been as bad as that of Carlos Gomez?
Wait, he says that Gomez had a better year than Young? How's that again?
Oh, he does it by cherry-picking metrics, and then misinterpreting them. For starters, SBG claims that Young was overall below replacement level in value because of his -18.4 runs as measured by UZR. Of course, UZR runs aren't measured from the replacement level, but from the league average. Since SBG doesn't note whether he's using STATS UZR (which doesn't weight for handedness or ground/flyball pitcher tendencies, park effects, or even the estimated difficulty of the batted ball) or Mitchel Lichtman's more advanced UZR (which does adjust for these factors), I can't speak to how accurate the metric might be. I will point out that the Hardball Times Win Shares analysis has Young earning more defensive Win Shares in left field than Denard Span earned in right for the Twins in 2008, so the idea that Young was costing the Twins ballgames with his glove isn't necessarily a hard, undeniable fact -- even in Young's infamously bad defensive game against the Royals, the Twins eventually rallied and won. Of course, with Young trailing all major-league left-fielders in Dewan plus/minus in 2008, it seems that his reputation is assured, at least, despite nearly all of that minus total having been put up in 2008 -- the three-year plus/minus totals have Young comfortably ahead of true defensive butchers like Pat Burrell and Manny Ramirez.
For the record, that Hardball Times link above shows that Young and Gomez had roughly equivalent seasons in terms of Win Shares, with Young slightly ahead. So no, it's not obvious that Gomez had a better year.
SBG also complains that Young "supposedly had this crazy high ceiling" when he was acquired by the Twins, though the reason why is pretty clear to see if you look at it -- certainly his ceiling is far higher than that of Carlos Gomez:
- Young and Gomez are nearly the same age; Young (born September 14, 1985) is actually less than three months older than Gomez (born December 4, 1985). For baseball purposes, they are the same age, so any potential development available to Gomez is, in theory, exactly as available to Young.
- Young has had better production in the minor leagues than Gomez; Gomez batted .278 with 18 home runs in 1291 minor league at-bats, primarily at A and AA. Young has hit .318 with 59 home runs (more in each of two different seasons than Gomez has hit in his entire minor league career) in 1413 minor league at-bats, mainly at AA and AAA.
- Young has put up those superior numbers while playing against tougher competition at the same age. When Gomez was 18, he spent the entire season playing for the Mets' two rookie-league teams; Young spent his age-18 season in A-ball for the Rays. At 19, Gomez spent the whole year in A-ball; Young split time between AA and AAA. Gomez got a fairly good-sized cup of coffee with the Mets due to outfield injuries in his age-21 season; Young spent his entire age-21 seasaon on the Ray's big-league roster and finished 2nd in the Rookie of the Year vote that season.
Anybody who claims that Gomez has a higher ceiling than Young doesn't know what the hell he's talking about. Though similarity scores are notoriously sketchy for players with such few actual big-league appearances, it's still telling that Young's of-age comps include Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente and Carl Yastrzemski (Yaz is actually Young's #1 of-age comp), while Gomez's of-age comps include Milt Cuyler and Lee Mazzilli. Young could continue to disappoint and still end up with a career not far from Larry Hisle's, while Gomez would have to gain about thirty points of batting average just to be the next Ted Uhlaender.
Okay, now I'm engaging in a bit of hyperbole, but just a bit. Right now, people are complaining because Jason Bartlett is getting way more credit than he deserves for the Rays run to the World Series last year, and Matt Garza hasn't yet proven himself a head-case with his new ballclub. Had the Twins won game 163 and advanced to the Series themselves, I doubt there would be nearly as much Delmon Young hatred on teh interwebs as I've seen of late.
If the Twins can get a good deal for Young, I won't complain, but the final nail in SBG's coffin comes when he talks about how much better not just Carlos Gomez is than Delmon Young, but how great it would be if the Twins acquired journeyman Gabe Gross, traded to the Rays for a minor leaguer during the 2008 season. Now Gross is far from a worthless player -- he'll take a walk and occasionally surprise you with some pop in his bat, and he's a solid if unspectacular defensive outfielder. But let's put it this way -- Gabe Gross's career, to this point, has been nearly identical (similarity score 960) to that of Dustan Mohr through his age 28 season. Mohr started falling off the planet at age 29, and didn't get even a single big-league at-bat in 2008. Gross would have been a great acquisition back in 2005, when he could have filled Mohr's role on the club after the latter's departure from the Twins; picking Gross up now would be like taking a flyer on Rickey Henderson. Long-term plan, this ain't.
All indications are that Young had real problems adjusting to the Metrodome defensively, and word from sources indicates that Young has something to prove this season, possibly his last before arbitration. Given how close the Twins were to the playoffs last year, and how much room Young has in his upside, I think the Twins would be crazy not to at least give Young a chance to show the club what he can do.
Of course, Ron Gardenhire is thinking of starting Nick Punto at short and Carlos Gomez in the outfield, so it might well be a long, long summer.
Sunday, December 7, 2008
Top Five Myths of the Twins 2008 Season - pt 3
There was a fair amount of interest in the Twins offense over the past month as the club's brain trust heads to Las Vegas for baseball's winter meetings. It's a good thing, too, because otherwise the third myth will bite the club right on the tuckus in 2009:
Myth #3: The Twins had an above-average offense in 2008.
This would seem like a difficult myth to support, given that the Twins offense ended the 2008 season with 829 runs scored, the third highest total (and third-highest rate, given that the Twins actually played one more game than most of their rivals on the list) in the American League. Scoring a lot of runs by definition makes you a good offense, doesn't it?
Actually, it depends -- mainly on how you scored your runs, and if that scoring is based on things that are repeatable in subsequent seasons. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
In 2006, the last time the AL Central went down to the final day of the regular season, the Twins scored 801 runs. 801 runs is a reasonable aggregate total, an average of just under five runs per game, but it was only good enough to finish 8th in the AL in 2006. More to the point, that offensive performance was achieved based on career years from a number of Twins regulars -- Joe Mauer had a career year in 2006 (.347/936) en route to his first batting title. Justin Morneau had a career year (.321/934) while winning the league MVP award. Nick Punto had a career year (.290/725); though it might not look like a ton, Punto's 2006 total was significantly higher than his career totals prior to 2006 (.238/623). At the time, I noted that way too many Twins regulars had hit above their heads in 2006, and to expect them all to do it again was simply unrealistic. Sure enough, the Twins trotted out much the same lineup in 2007 and scored just 718 runs -- third worst in the AL -- as nearly every Twins regular hit below his 2006 total.
The 2008 Twins aren't exactly the same as the 2006 Twins -- there were still some good-hitting seasons (especially from Mauer and Morneau), but among Twins who'd been on the roster in 2006, only Alexi Casilla had an improved hitting line in 2008 over his 2006 numbers. (And in Casilla's case, his 2006 hitting line was 1-for-4.)
That doesn't mean that there aren't players to watch for a decline in 2009, however; Denard Span hit .297/819 for the Twins in 2008, though his overall minor league numbers in 6 seasons run at just .287/715. Likewise, Nick Punto raised his career average back above .250 by hitting .284/726 in 2008, but he's only had one season where he's finished within ten points of that career average and just two where he's finished within thirty points of it, and in each case he's had more seasons below average than above it.
Still, Span is just one guy, and Punto might not even be with the team in 2009, given his current free agent status. The bigger worry for 2009 has to be the fluky way in which the Twins offense operated for much of 2008.
For starters, the Twins offense had a very well-documented surge of good hitting with runners in scoring position all year long. The Twins as a team hit .305/826 with runners in scoring position in 2008. Though the Twins led the league in batting average in RISP positions, they didn't actually lead in OPS in those situations -- they finished second behind the Rangers in OPS. And therein lies part of the rub. Compare the Twins offensive performance in RISP versus overall against that of Texas:
The Rangers had a bit more pop in RISP than in other situations, but certainly within the realm of both the traditional offense's tendency to hit better with 'runners on' than overall, as well as small sample size considerations. The Twins, meanwhile, were significantly above their overall production when hitting with RISP in 2008, so much so that many observers (myself included) spent much of the year wondering when the offense would come back down to earth.
That they didn't do so during the 2008 season, however, doesn't mean that they can repeat their performance in 2009, and a quick glance at the Twins' historical record in these situations should illustrate that:
With the exceptions of the 2002 and 2003 Twins, the club under Gardenhire generally improved in RISP situations about the same way that Texas showed in 2008 -- a small bump in BA and about a 50-point rise in OPS. In no other season under Gardenhire have the Twins ever previously shown the kind of bump they showed in RISP situations in 2008, so unless we can find a roster-specific reason why the 2008 club would be better than other Twins clubs in hitting with RISP, it would be reasonable to expect that they won't hit that well with RISP in 2009, which would lower the team's scoring to some degree.
The problem for the Twins offense is that hitting with runners in scoring position wasn't the only fluke they experienced in 2008. Consider the following comparison:
That looks weird, doesn't it? The Twins gained twenty points of average and over fifty points of OPS when playing at home, while their opponents lost nearly forty points of average and over a hundred points of OPS in the same move. The superficially sabermetric among the Twins blogosphere simply assume that the culprit was the Twins young pitching staff 'sucking' on the road (as if there was some exercise or coaching that could help a pitcher do better away from home). The folks who make it their business to understand (to at least some degree) baseball statistics, however, awarded the Metrodome the lowest multi-year park factor in its history, suggesting that not only was the 'Dome one of the best pitcher's parks in all of baseball in 2008, but that the real mystery is the performance of the Twins hitters, not the performance of their pitchers.
Compounding the mystery is analysis showing that some Twins regulars did actually have more trouble hitting at home than on the road in 2008 -- Justin Morneau might have won the MVP award if he'd hit as well at home (.286/847) as he hit on the road (.314/897), and though Brendan Harris had only about a half-season of at-bats, his production was still slightly better on the road (.268/724) than in the 'Dome (.262/718).
But just as many Twins regulars in 2006 had career years, many Twins -- and not just the regulars -- in 2008 had a year that bucked the expectations of their ballpark:
Including Randy Ruiz would be a bit of a stretch, given that he had less than 40 official PAs on the road and less than 30 at home, but even he shows this trend (.346/837/.500 at home, .222/588/.318 on the road). Meanwhile, had Joe Mauer hit as well on the road as he hit at home in the pitcher-friendly Metrodome, he, not Dustin Pedroia, would have been the league MVP.
The key is the third entry in the numbers above - BABIP, which stands for Batting Average on Balls in Play. Originally posited as a pitching statistic to show how a pitcher may have been aided by his defense or by luck, the batting version of this number, since it's achieved against many different calibers of defensive play, is largely a record of how often balls just 'fell in' for a hitter when he actually managed to get his bat on them. Throughout MLB in 2008, the mean BABIP for all at-bats comes out to a nearly even .300, which suggests that hitting significantly above .300 on your balls in play is lucky, while hitting significantly less than that is unlucky. And the size of the difference in BABIP certainly looks significant in this sample -- the Twins with greater-than-100 point OPS improvements at home are also the Twins who hit 60-70+ points higher on balls in play at home.
Again, as I noted back in 2006, it would be a logical error to assume that just because so many Twins were hitting 'in luck' in 2008 that they'll all hit 'out of luck' in 2009. (That's the gambler's fallacy, to be precise.) Still, it's not necessary for the Twins to be unlucky for their offense to drop in 2009 -- all it'll take is for their production to regress toward the mean, a process so ubiquitous and powerful that even a monkey could predict it.
Myth #3: The Twins had an above-average offense in 2008.
This would seem like a difficult myth to support, given that the Twins offense ended the 2008 season with 829 runs scored, the third highest total (and third-highest rate, given that the Twins actually played one more game than most of their rivals on the list) in the American League. Scoring a lot of runs by definition makes you a good offense, doesn't it?
Actually, it depends -- mainly on how you scored your runs, and if that scoring is based on things that are repeatable in subsequent seasons. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
In 2006, the last time the AL Central went down to the final day of the regular season, the Twins scored 801 runs. 801 runs is a reasonable aggregate total, an average of just under five runs per game, but it was only good enough to finish 8th in the AL in 2006. More to the point, that offensive performance was achieved based on career years from a number of Twins regulars -- Joe Mauer had a career year in 2006 (.347/936) en route to his first batting title. Justin Morneau had a career year (.321/934) while winning the league MVP award. Nick Punto had a career year (.290/725); though it might not look like a ton, Punto's 2006 total was significantly higher than his career totals prior to 2006 (.238/623). At the time, I noted that way too many Twins regulars had hit above their heads in 2006, and to expect them all to do it again was simply unrealistic. Sure enough, the Twins trotted out much the same lineup in 2007 and scored just 718 runs -- third worst in the AL -- as nearly every Twins regular hit below his 2006 total.
The 2008 Twins aren't exactly the same as the 2006 Twins -- there were still some good-hitting seasons (especially from Mauer and Morneau), but among Twins who'd been on the roster in 2006, only Alexi Casilla had an improved hitting line in 2008 over his 2006 numbers. (And in Casilla's case, his 2006 hitting line was 1-for-4.)
That doesn't mean that there aren't players to watch for a decline in 2009, however; Denard Span hit .297/819 for the Twins in 2008, though his overall minor league numbers in 6 seasons run at just .287/715. Likewise, Nick Punto raised his career average back above .250 by hitting .284/726 in 2008, but he's only had one season where he's finished within ten points of that career average and just two where he's finished within thirty points of it, and in each case he's had more seasons below average than above it.
Still, Span is just one guy, and Punto might not even be with the team in 2009, given his current free agent status. The bigger worry for 2009 has to be the fluky way in which the Twins offense operated for much of 2008.
For starters, the Twins offense had a very well-documented surge of good hitting with runners in scoring position all year long. The Twins as a team hit .305/826 with runners in scoring position in 2008. Though the Twins led the league in batting average in RISP positions, they didn't actually lead in OPS in those situations -- they finished second behind the Rangers in OPS. And therein lies part of the rub. Compare the Twins offensive performance in RISP versus overall against that of Texas:
BA/OPS in RISP overall
Texas .287/856 .283/816
Minnesota .305/826 .279/748
The Rangers had a bit more pop in RISP than in other situations, but certainly within the realm of both the traditional offense's tendency to hit better with 'runners on' than overall, as well as small sample size considerations. The Twins, meanwhile, were significantly above their overall production when hitting with RISP in 2008, so much so that many observers (myself included) spent much of the year wondering when the offense would come back down to earth.
That they didn't do so during the 2008 season, however, doesn't mean that they can repeat their performance in 2009, and a quick glance at the Twins' historical record in these situations should illustrate that:
BA/OPS in RISP overall
2008 Twins .305/826 .279/748
2007 Twins .276/759 .264/721
2006 Twins .296/821 .287/771
2005 Twins .271/764 .259/714
2004 Twins .277/803 .266/763
2003 Twins .268/746 .277/772
2002 Twins .269/748 .272/769
With the exceptions of the 2002 and 2003 Twins, the club under Gardenhire generally improved in RISP situations about the same way that Texas showed in 2008 -- a small bump in BA and about a 50-point rise in OPS. In no other season under Gardenhire have the Twins ever previously shown the kind of bump they showed in RISP situations in 2008, so unless we can find a roster-specific reason why the 2008 club would be better than other Twins clubs in hitting with RISP, it would be reasonable to expect that they won't hit that well with RISP in 2009, which would lower the team's scoring to some degree.
The problem for the Twins offense is that hitting with runners in scoring position wasn't the only fluke they experienced in 2008. Consider the following comparison:
Metrodome Road Games
Twins offense .289/777 .269/722
Opp offense .255/697 .294/813
That looks weird, doesn't it? The Twins gained twenty points of average and over fifty points of OPS when playing at home, while their opponents lost nearly forty points of average and over a hundred points of OPS in the same move. The superficially sabermetric among the Twins blogosphere simply assume that the culprit was the Twins young pitching staff 'sucking' on the road (as if there was some exercise or coaching that could help a pitcher do better away from home). The folks who make it their business to understand (to at least some degree) baseball statistics, however, awarded the Metrodome the lowest multi-year park factor in its history, suggesting that not only was the 'Dome one of the best pitcher's parks in all of baseball in 2008, but that the real mystery is the performance of the Twins hitters, not the performance of their pitchers.
Compounding the mystery is analysis showing that some Twins regulars did actually have more trouble hitting at home than on the road in 2008 -- Justin Morneau might have won the MVP award if he'd hit as well at home (.286/847) as he hit on the road (.314/897), and though Brendan Harris had only about a half-season of at-bats, his production was still slightly better on the road (.268/724) than in the 'Dome (.262/718).
But just as many Twins regulars in 2006 had career years, many Twins -- and not just the regulars -- in 2008 had a year that bucked the expectations of their ballpark:
BA/OPS/BABIP Home BA/OPS/BABIP Road
Mauer .362/949/.365 .295/782/.320
Young .300/764/.344 .280/716/.330
Gomez .278/689/.360 .236/622/.298
Kubel .299/876/.331 .248/741/.262
Punto .299/767/.340 .267/681/.328
Casilla .314/773/.348 .257/659/.264
Span .291/849/.345 .296/797/.335
Redmond .322/738/.345 .257/584/.281
Tolbert .313/770/.385 .262/669/.304
Including Randy Ruiz would be a bit of a stretch, given that he had less than 40 official PAs on the road and less than 30 at home, but even he shows this trend (.346/837/.500 at home, .222/588/.318 on the road). Meanwhile, had Joe Mauer hit as well on the road as he hit at home in the pitcher-friendly Metrodome, he, not Dustin Pedroia, would have been the league MVP.
The key is the third entry in the numbers above - BABIP, which stands for Batting Average on Balls in Play. Originally posited as a pitching statistic to show how a pitcher may have been aided by his defense or by luck, the batting version of this number, since it's achieved against many different calibers of defensive play, is largely a record of how often balls just 'fell in' for a hitter when he actually managed to get his bat on them. Throughout MLB in 2008, the mean BABIP for all at-bats comes out to a nearly even .300, which suggests that hitting significantly above .300 on your balls in play is lucky, while hitting significantly less than that is unlucky. And the size of the difference in BABIP certainly looks significant in this sample -- the Twins with greater-than-100 point OPS improvements at home are also the Twins who hit 60-70+ points higher on balls in play at home.
Again, as I noted back in 2006, it would be a logical error to assume that just because so many Twins were hitting 'in luck' in 2008 that they'll all hit 'out of luck' in 2009. (That's the gambler's fallacy, to be precise.) Still, it's not necessary for the Twins to be unlucky for their offense to drop in 2009 -- all it'll take is for their production to regress toward the mean, a process so ubiquitous and powerful that even a monkey could predict it.
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